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LAIRD V. TATUM: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND A FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 
TO MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF' 
LAWFUL CIVILLAN POLITICAL ACTMTY:k 
The First Amendment was adopted to elevate and defend the 
central right of a free people: the right to peaceably dissent, to argue, 
to persuade, and to demonstrate. The United States Army was 
created to preserve and protect our society. Laird v. Taturn: a class 
action challenge to military surveillance of civilian politics, demon- 
strates with frightening precision the degree to which the force of 
protection can and has imperiled the instrument of freedom. 
There was no evidence in the record before the Supreme Court 
to show the extent to which lawful political activity was chilled and 
deterred by Army intelligence, The reasons are several. The action 
was initiated with a modicum of information; much that is known 
today was not known at the time of the District Court hearing. More 
important, individuals present in court who were prepared to relate 
their experiences monitoring civilian activity were not allowed to 
take the stand and, instead, took their story to the country through 
a press conference. 
This Comment will explore the salient issues raised by Laird v. 
Tatum and will attempt to answer the following questions: Did the 
Supreme Court err in denying the political activists an opportunity 
to present witnesses at a District Court hearing and in deciding 
the issues on the original papers and appellate brieb? Was the Mili- 
tary Intelligence (hereinafter MI) program complained of an imper- 
missible abridgment of First Amendment rights? Did Justice 
Rehnquist behave improperly by participating in the Laird u. 
Tatum decision? Last, to what extent has the Supreme Court's de- 
cision in this case affected future adjudication of First Amendment 
class action challenges to government programs of surveillance and 
data compilation related to lawful political activity?2 
+ The author gratefully admowledges the support and advice of his friend and 
colleague, Christopher H. Pyle, Esq. The comments, criticisms and constant intellectual 
stimulation of Professor Burton C. Agata were invaluable. 
1. 408 US. 1 (1972). 
2. The author served in the U.S. Army in Military Intelligence from October 
1965 to October 1968. From July 1967 to October 1968, he was assigned to the Counter- 
intelligence Analysis Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 
United States Army, Washington, D.C. In that capacity he was the desk, or action, 
officer responsible for Left Wing/Anti-War and Civil Disturbance Analysis. Inevitably 
the analysis and conclusions in this comment are to a certain degree based on his 
experiences and perceptions stemming from that tour of duty. For the author's account 
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In January 1970, The Washington Monthly, a social and politi- 
cal science magazine, published "CONUS Intelligence: The Army 
Watches Civilian Politics," by Christopher H. Pyle, a lawyer and 
former captain in MI. Pyle stated that "[tlhe U.S. Army has been 
closely watching civilian political activity within the United States. 
Nearly 1,000 plainclothes investigators . . . keep track of political 
protests of all kinds-from Klan rallies in North Carolina to antiwar 
speeches at Harvard."3 In his article, Pyle reproduced a portion of 
an MI intelligence summary which described a number of political 
activities and named participants and organizations.* 
The reaction to Pyle's article was immediate. While newspaper 
reporters investigated Pyle's allegations, senators and congressmen 
queried appropriate officials in the Department of Defense and the 
Department of the Army to determine whether the military, as Pyle 
claimed, actually maintained "fles on the membership, ideology, 
programs, and practices of virtually every activist political group in 
the countryW6 and conducted a program of surveillance. 
A number of the persons and organizations mentioned in the 
MI summary reproduced in Pyle's article, together with other po- 
litical activist individuals and groups, engaged the American Civil 
Liberties Union to initiate a class action challenge to the constitu- 
tionality of the Army's domestic intelligence 
The action commenced by the activists, Laird v. Tatum, was dis- 
missed by the Supreme Court after two and a half years of litigation 
on October 10, 1972. 
The case raised a number of still unsettled and pressing consti- 
tutional issues, as well as questions concerning Mr. Justice Rehn- 
quist's judicial propriety in participating in the Laird v. Tatum 
decision, the latter of a critical importance since the Associate Jus- 
tice's vote decided the case against the plaintiffs. 
The Laird v. Tatum plaintiffs6 filed their complaint in the 
of his experience in military intelligence see Stein, The Expansion of Counter Intelli- 
eence. in UNCLE SAM IS WATCHING YOU (1971). See also WHISTLE BLOWING 126-134 
- 
(R. ~ a d e r ,  P. Petkas, K. Black~vell, eds. 1972): 
3. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence; The A m y  Watches Civilians Politics, 1 THE WASHING- 
TON MONTHLY, (Jan. 1970). 
4. Id. at 5-6. 
5.  Id. at 5. 
6. The individual plaintiffs were: Arlo Tatum, Executive Secretary of the Central 
Committee for Conscientious Obejctors; Conrad Lynn, a private attorney; Benjamin N. 
Wyatt, Jr., also a private attorney: and the Reverend Albert B. Cleage, Jr., Minister 
of the Shrine of the Black Madonna in Detroit, Michigan. Organizational plaintiffs 
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United States District Court for the District of Columbia on Feb- 
ruary 17, 1970.7 They named as defendants in their suit for injunc- 
tive and declaratory relief Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and 
several high-ranking Army officials.8 
The complaint, based almost exclusively on the Pyle article? al- 
leged that the MI program created an impermissable First Amend- 
ment chill, was ultra uires and exceeded the la~vful needs of the 
United States Army in carrying out its constitutional and statutory 
role with regard to intervention in civil disorders.1° The litigants 
sought a declaration that the Army's activity was unconstitutional 
and prayed for a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining 
the Army from engaging in the surveillance and data-compilation 
activities disclosed by Pyle.11 Also sought in the same motion were 
a permanent injunction forbidding the defendants from applying 
security classifications to reports of civilian political activity and a 
mandatory injunction directing the defendants to produce for the 
court, but explicitly not for public disclosure, all documents and 
files pertaining to military surveillance of civilian politics.12 A sep- 
arate motion for a temporary restraining order was denied.18 
In a memorandum prior to oral argument before the District 
Court, the plaintiffs alleged that "the Army's domestic intelligence 
program also involves the conduct of undercover operations by mili- 
tary agents within the civilian community. . . ."I4 This allegation, as 
were: Women Strike for Peace; Chicago Area Women for Peace; the Vietnam Week 
Committee of the University of Pennsylvania; The Vietnam Education Group of 
Knoxville, Kentucky; Veterans for Peace in Vietnam; The American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees; the Vietnam Moratorium Committee; Clergy 
and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam; and the War Resisters League. 
7. Tatum v. Laird, Civil No. 459-70 (DD.C., 1970). 
8. The other defendants were: Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor; General 
William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff; and Brigadier General William H. 
BIakefield, Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Command. None 
of them currently hold the above positions. The defendants were sued individually 
and in their olcial capacity. 
9. From the date of publication of Pyle's article to the time of filing of the com- 
plaint in Laird v. Tatum no further information had come to the attention of plain- 
tiffs' counsel. Shortly after the complaint was filed, several individuals with personal 
and extensive knowledge of the Army's activity came fonvard, including the author. 
Pyle, an instructor at  the US. Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Baltimore, 
Maryland, had never been personally involved in the activity complained of, but he 
had picked up  enough information from friends and acquaintances to write the 
January 1970 article. 
10. Complaint of Tatum et el., supra note 7. 
11. Id. at  2. 
12. Id. at  10. 
13. Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Tatum v. Laid, Civil No. 
459-70 (D3.C.. filed Mar. 12, 1970, denied Mar. IS, 1970). 
14. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunc- 
tion and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at  1. 
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will be discussed later, is of seminal significance in analyzing Laird 
v. Tatum. 
Responding to the plaintiff's assertions in the several pre-hearing 
motion papers, the defendants stated that the Army's preparation 
for its civil disturbance mission necessitated that information be col- 
lected before a crisis, and that such collection was reasonable and 
implied by statutes which authorize the Army's civil disturbance 
function.lG The defendants ~vould not discuss the specific activities 
of the MI branch, but urged that the Army's conduct was constitu- 
tional and claimed that the Laird v. Tatum activists had failed to 
state grounds upon which relief could be granted. An affidavit filed 
by Under Secretary of the Army Thaddeus R. Beal did admit, how- 
ever, that "As a result of a review of the intelligence activities of the 
U.S. Army it has been determined that certain records maintained 
by the Army were not useful and were not necessary in view of the 
Army's mission."16 The Beal affidavit did not elaborate on the nature 
or scope of MI holdings concerning civilians. 
On April 22, 1970, oral argument on the motion papers was 
heard in the District Court by Judge George L. Hart, Jr. Present 
in the courtroom were a number of former MI agents who were pre- 
pared to testify on behalf of the plainti% as to the extent and nature 
of MI operation~;~'' three of these former agents were willing to dis- 
cuss covert and clandestine infiltration operations conducted by MI 
personnel?* 
Judge Hart refused to allow plaintiffs' counsel, Professor Frank 
Askin of Rutgers University School of Law, and Melvin L. Wulf, 
National Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, to 
present any witnesses. He insisted instead that oral argument was 
sufficient. Ignoring the claim of Professor Askin that the witnesses 
present in court were able to testify as to the existence of covert op- 
erations, Judge Hart concluded that MI activity seemed to be lim- 
ited to the clipping of news media reports. Such activity, he 
maintained, whether engaged in by the Army or by the press, is 
- - 
15. Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition to Pla inW Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 3-7. 
16. Affidavit of Thaddeus R. Beal. 
17. The author and two former agents were present in the courtroom and pre- 
pared to testify. Unfortunately, counsel for plaintiffs had not secured affidavits from 
the persons prepared to testify. As a result, Judge Hart, after refusing to hear witnesses, 
had no means of learning that serious charges of clandestine operations by the Army 
were being advanced by the litigants. 
18. Much of the material which the former agents were prepared to discuss during 
testimony was publicly revealed for the first time in a press conference immediately 
after the District Court hearing. See N~VSVEEK, May 4, 1970, at 35-36. 
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equally constitutional. Hart, in dismissing the action,'O found that 
no unconstitutional action by the Army was sho~vn and that the 
complainants had not alleged any unla~vful conduct.20 On April 23, 
1970 an appeal was filed. On April 27, 1971, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia remanded the case to the District Court 
for an evidentiary hearing.21 Judge Wilkey, for the majority, found,a2 
Because the evil alleged in the Army intelligence system is 
that of overbreadth . . . and because there is no indication 
that a better opportunity will later arise to test the constitu- 
tionality of the Army's action, the issue can be considered jus- 
ticiable at this time. 
He ackno~vledged that the military has a legitimate need for cer- 
tain information in order to effectively intervene in civil disorders. 
He noted also that "The questions are what type of information the 
military needs, how they should go about obtaining it, when they 
need it, and whether what the Army has done here has infringed 
any of appellants' rights."2a 
Whatever the Army had "done here" was limited, in the view 
of the court majority after examining the District Court record, to 
what "a good newspaper reporter would be able to gather by atten- 
dance at public meetings and the clipping of articles from publica- 
tions available on any ne~vsstand."~* Since the testimony of witnesses 
~vas absent, the court concluded that "[tlhere is no evidence of illegal 
or unla~vful surveillance activities. We are not cited to any clandes- 
tine intrusion by a military agent.JJ26 
The court recognized, however, that "[tlhe compilation of data 
by a civilian investigative agency is thus not the threat to civil lib- 
erties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of 
bee speech that such action by the military is. . . .JJ20 The court or- 
dered the case re-heard by the District Court to determine four 
principal issues:27 
1. The nature of the Army domestic intelligence system made 
the subject of appellants' complaint, specifically the extent of 
19. Oral dismissal on April 22, 1970. 
20. Order of Dismissal, April 29, 1970. 
21. 444 F.2d 947, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
22. Id. at 955-6. 
23. Id. at 953. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 957. 
27. Id. at 959. 
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the system, the methods of gathering the information, its 
content and substance, the methods of retention and distri- 
bution, and the recipients of the information. 
2. What part, if any, of the Army domestic intelligence gath- 
ering system is unrelated to or not reasonably necessary to the 
performance of the mission as defined by the Constitution, 
statutes, military regulations, and as interpreted by actions 
under those written definitions of the mission. 
3. Whether the existence of any overbroad aspects of the in- 
telligence gathering system, as determined above, has or might 
have an inhibiting effect on appellants or others similarly 
situated. 
4. Such relief as called for in accordance with the above estab- 
lished law and facts. 
Judge MacIGnnon dissented, finding that "the chill to this amor- 
phous group . . . is grounded in the unrealistic and speculative fear 
that the Government will improperly use the information against 
them."28 He asserted that the appellants lacked standing based on 
the admission of counsel during oral argument before Judge Hart 
that the plaintiffs were not cowed or chilled, but rather wished to 
represent those Americans who were supposedly so affected by the 
Army program.29 
The Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for certiorari 
on the issues of justiciability and standing.30 The government, in 
their briefs and before the Court, argued that the case lacked con- 
creteness and evidence of a real injury to the rights of the plaintiffs.81 
The defendants also asserted that the issue -was Sufficient 
public disclosure of clandestine MI activities by a large number of 
former military personnel had forced some admissions of inappro- 
priate activity by Army officials follo~ved by assurances that such ac- 
tivity had been halted. The defendants offered the Army's assurances 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Laud v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). The 
Court's jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. $ 1254(1). 
31. Id. at 2. 13-14, 32-33. 
32. Id. passim. In briefs and on oral argument before the Supreme Court, the 
government argued that such activities as had been determined by the Army to be 
unnecessary had been stopped and that there was no further cause for complaint. The 
defendants mere hampered to a certain degree by a continuing series of revelations 
by former Army personnel, some of which were in direct conflict with the assurances 
and statements of Army officials. While these developments were not, of course, before 
the Court, they were a matter of considerable public, legislative and news media 
interest. 
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to show that the issue was moot; they also alleged that the responsi- 
bility for insuring the lawful functioning of MI operations resided 
in  the Executive and Legislative branches.88 
The plainti& urged the Supreme Court to afErm the Court of 
Appeals order for an evidentiary heari11g.~4 Arguing that the record 
was insufficient for a valid determination of the constitutional 
issues,86 the plaintiffs alleged that many of the defendants' assertions 
of fact about First Amendment injury were, in reality, contested and 
could not be decided absent an opportunity to present witnesses 
and documentary evidence.86 
Prior to oral argument, an unusual brief amici curiae was sub- 
mitted to the Court. The amici, twenty-nine former MI officers and 
enlisted personnel, urged the Court to allow the plaintiffs an oppor- 
tunity to present witnesses and evidence in the trial court.87 They 
informed the Court that far from limiting its activities to clipping 
newspapers, MI, among other things, infiltrated agents into Resur- 
rection City,88 had agents pose as newsmen with bogus identification 
cards to obtain information from unsuspecting civilians during pro- 
tests?g had infiltrated the headquarters of the National Mobilization 
33. Petitioner's Brief, s u p a  note 30, at  83. The government had raised the separa- 
, 
tion of powers question at the District Court and the Court of Appeals level. The 
government urged the Court to accept the viewpoint that where a party seeking to 
represent a class similiarly situated failed to allege a specific personal injury the 
case lacked the clarity and focus required to maintain a case or controversy and was, 
in reality, a political question which the Legislative and Executive Branches were 
especialIy designated, under the Constitution, to decide. 
34. Respondents' Brief in Opposition, at 30, Lahd v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
35. Id. at  15. 
36. Id. at  9. 
37. For Tatum, et al., as Amin' Curiae, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Chris- 
topher H. Pyle and the author participated in the writing of the Brief. Counsel for 
the amici were Professor Burke Marshall, Deputy Dean of the Yale Law School, and 
Professor Arthur R. Miller, Harvard Law School. I t  is the author's belief that this 
Brief is unique in that, for the h t  time, individuals with a common background but 
no organizational link with one another were brought together for the sole purpose 
of submitting an amici brief to the Supreme Court. The expenses incurred in this 
undertaking ~vere shared by most of the arnici. 
38. Id. at  17. Resurrection City was the Washington, D.C. tent encampment of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Poor Peoples' Campaign. I t  was located 
between the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial. The author, on duty 
in the Pentagon, received daily reports from, among others, an Army major, a black 
o5cer who infiltrated Resurrection City after assuming a false identity and ~vith 
specific orders to attempt to Muence Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
policy. A large number of other agents, who reported regularly, roamed the area in 
casual clothing with orders to glean as much information as possible from participants 
in the Poor People's Campaign. 
39. Id. Agents with phony press cards and portable videotape units were ordered to 
conduct interviews with civilians during protests in the hope that those intervie~ved 
~vould divulge future plans. 
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Committee to End the War in Vietnam,4O had penetrated the Colo- 
rado Springs Young Adults ProjectFl and had assigned agents to 
stake-out Martin Luther King's grave to determine who came to 
the gravesideP2 
On June 26, 1972, Chief Justice Burger delivered the majority 
opinion in a 5 to 4 reversal of the Court of Appeals decision, thereby 
affirming the dismissal of the actionP3 The Court acknodedged the 
"traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military in- 
trusion into civilian but found that there had been no 
actual or threatened injury by reason of unla~v£ul activities by the 
Military. 
The Court notedp6 
The [Army's] information itself ~vas collected by a variety 
of means, but it is significant that the principal sources of in- 
formation were the news media and publications in general 
circulation. 
The Court majority, agreeing with the government's position, 
contended,a6 
The system put into operation as a result of the Army's 
1967 experience consisted essentially of the collection of in- 
formation about public activities that were thought to have 
at least some potential for civil disorder. . . . 
Of far greater import, however, was the Court's acceptance of the 
defendants' claim that Laird v. Tatum tvas nonjusticiable because 
the parties bringing the action had failed to show injury and thus 
lacked standing to sue. In the absence of injury, the issues raised 
required action by the Executive and Legislative branches if they 
perceived a need to respond to the allegations raised by the plaintiffs: 
The Court majority stated,47 
[They [plaintiffs] disagree with the judgments made by the 
Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of 
- - 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 17-18. 
42. Id. at 17. 
43. 408 US. 1 (1972). Joining the Chief Justice were Associate Justices White, 
Bladunun, Porvell and Rehnquist. 
44. Id. at 15. 
45. Id. at 6. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 13. 
Heinonline - -  1 Hofstra L. Rev. 251 1973 
252 Hofstra Law Review 
information the Army needs and that the very existence of the 
Army's data-gathering system produces a constitutionally im- 
permissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights. 
The political activists, in the opinion of the Court, sought a wide, 
self-conducted investigation of Army intelligence operations, uti- 
lizing the Federal judiciary as its agency of inqui~it ion.~~ 
Carried to its logical end, this approach tvould have the 
federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the tvisdom 
and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate 
for the Congress acting through its committees and the "power 
of the purse"; i t  is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual 
present or immediately threatened injury resulting from un- 
lawful governmental action.40 [emphasis added] 
The Court therefore concluded that the respondents lacked stand- 
ing to bring the action. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissent in tvhich 
Mr. Justice Marshall concurred, began by asserting that "Our tra- 
dition reflects a desire for civilian supremacy and subordination of 
military po~ver."bO Reviewing the role of the military, the Justice 
statedP1 
[Tlhe Armed Services . . . are not regulatory agencies or 
bureaus that may be created as Congress desires and granted 
such powers that seem necessary and proper. The authority to 
provide rules "governing" the Armed Services means the 
grant of authority to the Armed Services to govern them- 
selves, not the authority to govern civilians. 
He continued, "The action in turning the 'armies' loose on surveil- 
lance of civilians tvas a gross repudiation of our  tradition^."^^ 
Justice Douglas found that the majority's conclusion that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue ~vas "too transparent for serious 
argument."63 Noting that the Army allegedly maintains files on all 
groups engaged in activist politics,E4 "uses undercover agents to infil- 
trate these civilian groups . . ."66 and "moves as a secret group among 
48. Id. at 14. 
49. Id. at 15. 
50. Id. at 19. 
51. Id. at 18. 
52. Id. at 23. 
53. Id. at 24. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 25. 
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civilian audiences, using cameras and an electronic ear for surveil- 
lance,"" he concluded that, "One need not wait to sue until he loses 
his job or until his reputation is defamed. T o  withhold standing to 
sue until that time arrives ~vould, in practical effect, immunize from 
judicial scrutiny all surveillance activities, regardless of their misuse 
and their deterrent effect."57 
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a separate dissent concurred in by Asso- 
ciate Justices Stewart and Marshall, decried the denial to the plain- 
ti& of an opportunity to present evidence at the trial court level. 
Justice Brennan stated,68 
Respondents may or may not be able to prove the case 
they allege. But I agree with the Court of Appeals that they 
are entitled to try. 
Following the Supreme Court's June decision, the plaintiffs filed 
a petition for re-hearing. They also fded a motion for withdrawal of 
the Court's opinion, so that Mr. Justice Rehnquist could consider a 
separate motion addressed to him requesting recusal because of his 
prior involvement in the case. The petition and motions were denied 
on October 10, 197Z60 
The issues raised by Laird v. Tatum cannot be meaningfully 
examined solely in their legal context. Ttvo other areas must be ex- 
plored in some detail before an attempt can be made to analyze 
Laird: use of federal troops in civil disorders; and the Army's do- 
mestic intelligence program. 
A. The Use of Federal Troops in Civil Disorders 
The defendants in Laird relied on statutory authorization by 
implication for their data-collection on civilian activities. They also 
viewed the MI program as a necessary preparation for the commit- 
ment of Federal troops in civil disorders. It is useful to review the 
history of Federal troop commitment to see if the statutory provisions 
cited allo~v this expansive interpretation. 
Americans have al~vays been wary of military forces. The third 
amendment is as much a recognition of the coercive nature of mili- 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 26. 
58. Id. at 40. 
59. 93 S. Ct. 7 (1972). 
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tary force in a civil setting as it is a declaration of property rights. 
The debate over when and how to employ Federal forces to suppress 
civil disorder dates back to the founding days of the nation.OO As 
early as 1792, fears were voiced that the use of federal troops would 
dampen civil liberties. "Congressman John Francis Mercer of 
Virginia rose in the new House of Representatives to denounce a 
bill-to permit use of federal troops to control civil disorders, 'In no 
free country)) he said, 'can the [military] be called forth nor martial 
law proclaimed but under great restrictions.' "01 
Ttvo years after Congressman Mercer expressed his concern, 
President George Washington was faced with the Whiskey Rebel- 
lion, a Pennsylvania protest against the imposition of an excise tzx 
many considered to be little different from the hated British Stamp 
Act.02 Washington dispatched troops after 1vriting~8 
Not only the Constitution and Laws must strictly govern; but 
the employing of the regular troops avoided i f  it be possible to 
effect order without their aid. . . . Yet, i f  no other means will 
effectually answer, and the Constitution and Laws will au- 
thorise these they must be used as the Dernier resort. 
Washington was quick to warn, however, that the necessary de- 
ployment of troops because of the inability of local government to 
keep order did not mean that the military authorities were to govern. 
"The dispensation of .  . . justice belongs to the civil Magistrate and 
let it ever be our pride and our glory to leave the sacred deposit 
there ~nviolated."~~ 
Although there were occasional departures from Washington's 
standard, the concept that the employment of Federal forces must 
occur only when such commitment is the "Dernier resort" was 
accepted by most presidents.05 
60. See generally, A. YARMOLINSKY, THE M ~ T A R Y  ESTABLIS~~ENT (1971). This 
excellent study, especialIy chapter 11, is recommended for those desiring a more com- 
plete account of the role of the military in American society. 
61. Id. a t  153 (Footnote Omitted). 
62. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD H ~ O R Y  OF !rm AMERICAN PEOPS 540 (1965). 
63. 32 THE W ~ G S  OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 153 (J. Fitzpatrick, ed. 1931). 
64. 34 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASRINGTON 6 (J. Fitzpatrick, ed. 1931). 
65. The reluctance to commit troops is perhaps best illustrated by President Theo- 
dore Roosevelt's terse telegram to an Army commander during a bitter 1907 Nevada 
miners' riot: ''Do not act a t  all until President issues proclamation . . . . Better twenty- 
four hours of riot, damage, and disorder than illegal use of the troops." B. RICH, THE 
PRESWENIS AND CWz DISORDERS 129 (1941). 
Not all Presidents have been as concerned with maintaining control over Federal 
forces. President Wilson's directive that National Guard commanders should respond 
to all state requests for aid-at the time the Guard was federalized-has been severely 
criticized as an abdication of Federal power. Id. (1941). 
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As Washington correctly foresaw, occasions arise when the only 
means left to restore public order is the use of the Federal military 
might. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides the authority 
for such use and three statutory provisions define the procedures for 
the President to follow in dispatching the Army.66 The President 
may direct the commitment of federal forces upon a request by a 
state legislature, or a state governor if the legislature cannot be con- 
vened, to suppress civil disorder. Troops may be deployed by the 
President to combat a rebellion against the national government. 
Last, the Chief Executive may commit troops if state or national 
law is interfered with so as to result in a denial of constitutional 
rights to a part or a class of the state's pop~lation.~7 
Nowhere in these statutory provisions nor in any other legislation 
is there reference to or authority for pre-commitment activities on 
the part of the military. 
B. The Army's Domestic Intelligence Program 
Until former Army Captain Pyle's January 1970 article appeared, 
virtually no information had ever become public suggesting that the 
66. The statutes apply to the military in general, not just to the Army. In practice, 
however, the Army has been almost exclusively the branch of the Armed Forces which 
the President has called out for riot duty. 
67. 10 US.C. 5 331 provides: 
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the 
President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legisla- 
ture cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the 
other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed 
forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection. 
10 U.S.C. § 332 provides: 
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or 
assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it  
impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory 
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service 
such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers 
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. 
10 U3.C. 5 333 provides: 
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any 
other means, shall tak; such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, 
in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unla~vful combination, or con- 
spiracy, if it- 
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United 
States within the State, that any part or dass of its people is deprived of a 
right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and 
secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, 
or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protec- 
tion; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United 
States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation 
covered by clause (l), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal 
protection of the laws secured by the Constitution. 
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Army maintained a program of surveillance and data-compilation on 
civilians.SS 
In  February 1970, Pyle and the author initiated a nationwide 
investigation of MI activities.Bg Although the Army assured critics 
that it had re-evaluated its intelligence needs with regard to civil 
disturbance preparation, Pyle, in a second article in July 1970, sev- 
eral months after the District Court hearings in Laird, charged?O 
Despite over 50 Congressional inquiries, the threat of House 
and Senate hearings, and a lawsuit by the American Civil 
Liberties Union, more than 1,000 plainclothes soldier-agents 
continue to monitor the political activities of law-abiding 
citizens. 
He asserted that the Army, h d i n g  that "the rising tide of criticism 
could not be ignored,"Tl had issued a series of partial admissions. "In 
the jargon of the spy trade, such admissions are known as 'plausible 
denials,' because they are invested with just enough truth to mask 
an essential falsehood."72 
Although a number of senators and congressmen threatened to 
hold hearings on the Army's intelligence program, only one, Senator 
Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (Democrat-North Carolina), actually held hearings. 
In February and March 1971, the Subcommittee on Constitutional 
68. See generally J .  JENSEN, THE PRICE OF VIGILANCE (1968). This is a fascinating 
study of military surveillance of civilian politics during World War I and is one oE 
the only works to delve into this facet of military operations. Jensen examines the 
Army's fear of dissenters during the First World War and traces the steps taken by 
the fledgling MI Branch-then knom as the Corps of Intelligence Police-to monitor 
and control dissent. The Army entered into an extensive liaison relationship with the 
American Protective League, a vigilante group which sought to identify and neutralize 
German sympathizers and pacifists. One of the most chilling examples of MI activity 
in the sensitive area of First Amendment rights occurred in Butte, Montana, in 1917, 
when a military intelligence party raided a union printing plant with the aid of 
civilian vigilantes and arrested labor leaders and seized pamphlets. Among the Army 
raiders was then Major Omar N. Bradley. Apparently the only factor to prevent the 
enlargement of the Army's largely clandestine domestic police role during World 
War I was the termination of hostilities and the resultant cutback in appropriations 
for the MI Branch. THE PRICE OF VIGILANCE is must reading for those interested in 
fully understanding the constitutional implications of the issues raised in b i r d  v. 
Tatum. 
69. The author and Mr. Pyle began their investigation, which is still in progress, 
in February 1970. In connection with this study, the author has travelled throughout 
the United States, Canada, and the Virgin Islands to interview scores of former Army 
agents, as well as civilians affected by the Army's program. Some sources came volun- 
tarily fonvard while other were developed by Pyle and the author. Many have insisted 
on total anonymity in exchange for their cooperation. 
70. Pyle, CONUS Revisited: The Army Covers Up, 2 THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 
July 1970, at  49. 
71. Id. at 50. 
72. Id. 
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Rights, chaired by Senator Ervin, heard witnesses on eleven hearing 
days.7S Although the Subcommittee concerned itself with several 
issues, most of the hearing days were devoted to MI activities. The 
2,164 pages of testimony, documentary evidence, and related mate- 
rials published by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights are, 
at present, the only reference source on Army domestic spying.74 No 
attempt to outline the extensive material contained in the two vol- 
umes published will be made here, but a summary of the hearings 
is a prerequisite to understanding the analysis of Laird u. Tatum 
which follo~vs this section. 
Hearings witnesses testified that an Army agent, in civilian 
clothes, had attended black studies classes at New York University 
to monitor one professor and his course materiall6 Agents had iniil- 
trated and religious groups78 and had gathered 
data on virtually every activist group in the United States.79 Military 
intelligence agents attended both national political conventions in 
1968, according to ~vitnesses.8~ At the Chicago Democratic Conven- 
tion, undercover men with bogus news credentials wandered about 
with a videotape camera and conducted phony news interviews 
with protest leaders to determine their future plans.81 At the Miami 
Republican Convention, agents drifted aimlessly among the delegates 
on the convention floor after having been given vague and ill-defined 
orders to monitor political activityaS2 One witness related that he 
penetrated a church-sponsored youth group in Colorado because 
"one of the founders of the organization had been active in antiwar 
activities in Colorado Springs. . . ."88 This same agent had orders 
to spy on local anti-poverty agencies.% 
73. Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill of Rights Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong, 
1st Sess., pts. 1 and 2 (1971) pereinafter I Hearings and I1 Hearings respectively]. 
74. See STAFP OF SENATE COW. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON CONS~~FUTIONAL 
 RIG^, A R ~ N  SURVEILLANCE OF CkVmANs: A DOCUNENTARY ~ ~ A L Y ~ S ,  92nd Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (1972). This report analyzes the h y ' s  use of computers in connection with its 
MI program and is an essential appendix to the two Hearings volumes. 
75. I Hearings at 290. 
76. See statement and testimony of Christopher H. Pyle, I Hearings a t  147. See ako 
the author's statement and testimony, I Hearings a t  244. 
77. Note 76 supra. 
78. I Hearings at 305 and at 285. 
79. I Hearings passim. Virtually all of the former MI personnel who testified reported 
massive data-gathering. 
80. I Hearings a t  185, a t  198, and a t  274. 
81. See Pyle testimony in I Hearings at 147. 
82. I Hearings a t  274. 
83. Id. at 306. 
84. Id. at 308. 
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A black agent recounted his assignments to cover anti-~var meet- 
ings in churches and to cruise the black areas of Washington D.C. 
in a radio-equipped car, reporting on community activities.= On one 
occasion this former first lieutenant had to attend a children's Hal- 
loween party because refreshment ingredients for the party had been 
obtained from local stores by a known black militant.80 According 
to this witness, Army intelligence interest extended to the topic of 
birth control. 
Agents from our unit were detailed to attend a conference of 
dissenting priests from throughout the Washington Archdio- 
cese who were protesting the position that Archbishop O'Boyle 
had taken in reference to the birth control pill.87 
T o  store the information collected by the special agents and pro- 
vided by other agencies, the Army maintained several computer data 
banks as well as local intelligence files at approximately 300 Army 
intelligence field and resident offices throughout the U.S. These data 
banks contained information on hundreds of thousands of American 
citizens, much of it obtained from informers and undercover agents. 
Many of those under surveillance were either young men and women 
or black Americans, a fact that will be shown to have special rele- 
vance in establishing a theory of First Amendment chill caused by 
the MI program.88 T o  date, the Army has presented no evidence to 
show that its data banks and local field office files concerning civilians 
have been destroyed. 
Many of the witnesses before the Ervin Subcommittee stated that 
the Army received much of its information through liaison with 
other agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The 
author, while serving in MI in Washington, received hundreds of 
F.B.I. reports weekly on individuals and organizations involved in 
lawful dissent.8g 
The Department of the Army's principal spokesman before the 
Ervin Subcommittee was Robert F. Froehlke, then Assistant Secre- 
85. Id. at 288. 
86. Id. at 289. 
87. Id. 
88. See REPORT ON ARMY SURVELLANCE, supra note 74; author's testimony, I Hearings 
at 264-265 for a representative but very incomplete listing of the organizations moni- 
tored by MI. 
89. Some reports concerned criminal activity which had no bearing on or relation- 
ship to the Army. A small percentage of reports, no more than five percent in the 
author's estimation, contained information relevant and necessary for the accomplish- 
ment of the Army's mission. 
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tary of Defense (Administration).90 Froehlke acknowledged, "Clearly 
there is no precedent for the scope and intensity of information col- 
lection and analysis related to the civilian communities which oc- 
curred in the period in que~t ion."~~ He described in detail the civil 
disturbance picture during the period 1967-1970 and explained Army 
preparations for suppressing civil  disturbance^.^^ Dealing directly 
with the Army's involvement in monitoring civilian affairs, Froehlke 
depicted most of the Army's effort as directly related to tactical de- 
ployment of troops.93 He acknowledged that covert operations had 
taken place with official approval, in four instances.94 
Froehlke admitted that "a civil disturbance related covert collec- 
tion was authorized for an agent to enroll at New York University 
to monitor a special course entitled 'New Black Revolt,' in early 
1968."0E 
Froehlke conceded that as the pressure to obtain information by 
agent observation increased, "In some cases, the rather obscure de- 
marcation between direct agent observation and covert collection 
was probably transgre~sed."~6 [emphasis added] 
Undersecretary Froehlke concluded his testimony by emphasiz- 
ing the steps then being undertaken by the Department of the Army 
to limit Army intelligence collection to the minimal amount re- 
quired for mission preparedness.97 
In the context of this background, the legal issues can now be 
examined and weighed. 
The plaintiffs in Laird v. Tatum sought judicial relief for alleged 
infringements of their First Amendment rights, and on behalf of 
other individuals and organizations claiming the same right to engage 
in larvful political activity without being surveilled by Army agents. 
90. Mr. Froehlke is now Secretary of the Anny. 
91. I Hearings a t  376. 
92. Id. at 382-4. 
93. Id. at 382-6. 
94. Id. a t  387. The four acknorvledged operations took place at the following 
events: the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 1968; the March 
on the Pentagon in October 1967; the June 1968 Washington Spring Project (better 
known as the Poor People's Campaign); and the presidential inauguration in January 
1969. During these operations, agents were admittedly used to infiltrate groups in 
order to obtain information on personalities and activities associated with the event. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 388. 
97. Id. at 392 et seq. 
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In affirming the dismissal below, the Supreme Court has raised many 
issues which will affect future First Amendment adjudication. 
A. The Chilling Eflect 
The rights protected by the First Amendment were recognized 
in Dombrowski v. Pfister to be a public interest "of transcen- 
dant value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their 
rights. . . ."98 Any government policies or the acts of government 
officials which restrain, limit, deter or control individuals in the 
exercise of First Amendment rights directly conflict with the Su- 
preme Court's finding in New York Times Co. u. Sullivan that the 
First Amendment embodies "a profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust and wide-open. . . 
The scope of public issues for debate is vast. Some topics are of 
limited impact and interest, others are far-reaching and charged with 
controversy and dissension. Throughout history, governments have 
attempted by various means to suppress dissent by citizens. The First 
Amendment -was designed not only to allo~v dissent, but to protect 
and encourage this fundamental right. 
In  Laird v. Tatum, the plaintiffs did not assert that the Army 
attempted to directly prohibit protest, dissent, or speech. Rather, 
they maintained that the Army's system of surveillance and data- 
compilation exerted an unhealthy and inhibiting effect on the exer- 
cise of First Amendment rights which deterred Americans from 
enjoying those constitutional provisions. The absence of a direct 
intent to prevent speech or lawful dissent does not obviate First 
Amendment challenges, for as Justice Brennan stated in Lamont v. 
Postmaster General, "inhibition as well as prohibition against the 
exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power denied to 
government."loO 
The question arising from Justice Brennan's statement is what 
government activity constitutes the impermissible inhibiting of 
First Amendment rights? In Watkins v. United States, the Court 
found that where people are identified with views that are "unor- 
thodox, unpopular or even hateful to the general public," there is an 
injury covered by the First Amendment.lol 
Perhaps the greatest fear of the Laird plaintie was the possibility 
98. 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
99. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
100. 381 US. 301, 309 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring opinion). 
101. 354 US. 178, 197 (1951). 
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that they or their follo.cvers might be the subject of governmental 
sanctions as a result of their political activity. As the Court noted in 
NAACP v. Button, "The threat of sanctions may deter almost as 
potently as the actual application of sanctions."lo2 
Sanctions for the exercise of First Amendment rights have been 
attempted. In Dombroski v. Pfister, the threat of prosecution under 
an overbroad state statute was found to chill First Amendment rights. 
Justice Brennan noted that "Because of the sensitive nature of con- 
stitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all those 
subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their 
rights."103 
Other forms of governmental sanctions besides prosecution may 
also be employed. Security clearances may be denied, promotions 
may not come, positions may not be offered, employment may be 
terminated. T o  determine whether a First Amendment chill exists, 
we must look beyond the possibility or probability of prosecution 
and examine the complained of conduct with reference to the 
claimed necessity for such activity by government and the impact 
of the conduct on the complainants. 
In Lamont, the Supreme Court invalidiited a government scheme 
which required individuals desiring to receive certain types of mail 
from communist countries to afErmatively indicate such desire before 
receiving the mail. The case established the proposition that govern- 
ment cannot demand that people act affirmatively in response to 
government requests for information as a pre-condition for the en- 
joyment of First Amendment rights. As the lower court noted in 
Heilberg v. gixa, a companion case decided by the Supreme Court 
with Lamont, the unwillingness of the individual to be identified 
in the eyes-and files--of government as one interested in unor- 
thodox concepts, groups or individuals is part of a deterrent to the 
free expression of ideas?04 Engagement in laTvful protest under the 
eyes and camera lenses of government agents can be seen as an afErma- 
tive act of the type struck down in Lamont. 
Recognizing that identification with a laTvful, albeit contro- 
versial cause can deter freedom of expression, the court granted an 
injunction forbidding state law enforcement officers from attending 
and monitoring union meetings in Local 309 v. Gates.lo5 Similarly, 
the Court recognized in NAACP v. Alabama that the compelled dis- 
102. 371 US. 415, 433 (1963). 
103. 380 US. at 486. 
104. 236 F. Supp. 405, 409 (N.D. Cal. 1964). 
105. 75 F. Supp. 620 (N9. Ind. 1948). 
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closure to government officials of membership lists can result in 
significant fears on the part of the organization's members that sanc- 
tions may follow and that these fears, admittedly not always rational, 
can act as a chilling deterrent on the members.lOO 
The Laird plaintiffs asserted that the Army's nationwide program 
created a chilling effect and was so extensive in operation that it 
could be seen as a "dragnet which may enmesh anyone."lo7 
Responding to the charges that MI surveillance created an im- 
permissible chill on First Amendment rights, the government ad- 
vanced a narrow interpretation of Dombrowski, arguing that no legal 
or criminal sanctions threatened any of the plaintiffs.lO* The Army's 
activity, according to the government, did not require disclosure of 
membership lists nor did MI operations entail the assumption of 
afkmative acts by the plaintiffs in order to exercise their rights. The 
government, noting that the plaintiffs ackno~vledged that the Army 
had a lawful civil disturbance mission, urged the Court to apply a 
balancing test to the situation at bar.log 
The lack of an evidentiary record precludes discussion of the 
actual Army practices which led to the Laird plaintiffs' chilling effect 
claims in this part of the comment (see Conclusion). The govern- 
ment's contention that a balancing test should be employed raises 
the fundamental question whether First Amendment rights may be 
balanced against activities adopted in the pursuit of lawful govern- 
mental policies and practices. 
The circumscription of First Amendment rights as a corollary 
to executing a valid governmental function has been found consti- 
tutionally repugnant "less under the guise of regulating conduct 
that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the 
press suffer."*1° The standard to be applied cannot simply be an 
inquiry into the nature and extent of the lawful state police power 
"but whether the means chosen to achieve a legitimate end are so 
sweeping that fundamental personal liberties are stifled."lll The 
balancing test was clearly rejected by the Court in United States u. 
Robel where the Court declared,l12 
- 
106. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
107. Herndon v. lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1987); Appellants' BrieE at 16, Tatum v. 
Laid, 444 F2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
108. Petitioners' Brief, sufra note 30, at 24. 
109. Id. at 2 et seq. 
110. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966). 
111. Davis v. Francois, 895 F2d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1968). 
112. 389 US. 258, 268, 1120 (1961). 
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Faced with a clear conflict benveen a federal statute enacted 
in the interests of national security and an individual's exer- 
cise of his First Amendment rights, we have confined our 
analysis to whether Congress has adopted a constitutional 
means in achieving its concededly legitimate legislative goal. 
. . . [Wle have in no way "balanced" those respective interests. 
We have ruled only that the Constitution requires that the 
conflict benveen congressional power and individual rights 
be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to 
avoid the conflict. 
In attempting to create a concept of balancing interests in Laird 
v. Tatum, the defendants sought to rely not on statutory enactments 
which clearly contain neither reference to nor mandate for the MI 
domestic program, but on directives of Department of Defense and 
Department of the Army officials interpreting their scope of au- 
thority under the statutes.llB 
In Laird, we do not find a clear conflict between statutes and 
First Amendment rights. There is, however, a sharp and clear conflict 
between Department of the Army directives, the claimed authority 
for which is statutory, and the individual's First Amendment rights. 
B. Justiciability, Separation of Powers and 
the Standing Question 
The value of the First Amendment to the American concept of 
society and government has resulted in the creation of a standard 
for justiciability in First Amendment cases which is less restricted 
113. 10 U.S.C. SS331-333 (1970). See I Hearings 375 et seq., testimony of Under Secre- 
tary of Defense FroehUce. I1 Hearings contains numerous Department of the Army 
directives concerning the collection of information about civilian organizations and 
personalities by &XI. It is interesting to note that the Army civil disturbance plans 
cite no authority in law. The author, based on his experience, believes that the chal- 
lenged Army program arose largely because military officers, inadequately and insuffi- 
ciently supwised by civilian superiors, consistently and disastrously misinterpreted the 
source and nature of urban strife and rioting. It appeared to the author that many 
of these high-ranking oficers were convinced that urban rioting was initiated because 
of conspiratorial activity on the part of a number of protest groups and their leaders. 
Insulated from frequent and meaningful contact with civilian communities, many of 
the Army's top-ranking generals were unable to grasp and comprehend the complex 
political, socio-economical and historical background which contributed to the out- 
break of tragic violence in American cities. The legal arguments advanced by the 
government at  various stages of Laird as authority for the MI program were, in the 
opinion of the author, afterthoughts brought on by the need to litigate the questions 
raised. In 16 months of Pentagon duty, the author never heard any high-ranking 
officer or civilian superior enunciate, much less question, the existence of a legal 
authority for the Army's program of surveillance and datacompilation. 
Heinonline - -  1 Hofstra L. Rev. 263 1973 
264 Hofstra Law Reaiew 
than one employed in cases not involving basic rights.ll* In Reed 
Enterprises v. Corcoran,l16 the Court found,l1° 
Where the plaintiff complains of chills and threats in the 
protected First Amendment area, a court is more disposed to 
find that he is presenting a real and not an abstract contro- 
versy. 
With reference to the relationship between sanctions and jus- 
ticiability, the Court in Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16 
noted:llT 
It has been held repeatedly that the mere threat of the impo- 
sition of unconstitutional sanctions will cause immediate and 
irreparable injury to the free exercise of rights as fragile and 
sensitive to suppression as the freedoms of speech and assem- 
bly. . . . Since it is the mere threat of unconstitutional sanc- 
tions which precipitates the injury, the courts must intervene 
at once to vindicate the threatened liberties. 
The Army's activity in itself may be a sanction against the exer- 
cise of First Amendment rights. The acknowledgement in Heilberg 
v. Fixa, that identification with unorthodox views by government 
can act as a deterent to lawful political participation makes obvious 
the concept that sanctions are not limited, as they were in Dom- 
browski, to possible or probable formal prosecutions. The very sur- 
veillance itself, especially at private meetings, is a form of forced 
disclosure of membership. I t  identifies persons at meetings whether 
or not they hold the unorthodox viewpoint espoused by a particular 
faction. Even if they do agree with the views of the speaker or orga- 
nization there is clearly no right to compel such identification. 
A determination of justiciability cannot await a finding that the 
challenged program is actually succeeding through design or chance 
in deterring lawful activity. Referring to the situation challenged in 
Dombrowski, the Court stated, "The chilling effect upon the exer- 
cise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of its prose- 
cution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure."ll8 If 
the view is accepted that a program of surveillance can, in some 
circumstances, be interpreted as a prosecution of a non-judicial 
- 
114. National Students Association v. Hershey, 412 F2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
115. 354 F2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
116. Id. at 523. 
117. 372 F2d 817, 824 (2nd Cir. 1967). 
118. 380 US. at 487. 
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nature, justiciability exists without a statement that the challenged 
activity has achieved its chilling effect. 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Laird majority, found that 
"it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediate 
threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action" to 
investigate an activity initiated and directed by the Executive 
Branch.l19 Departing from precedent in First Amendment cases, he 
denied justiciability, stating that:x2O 
m h e n  presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury 
resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, fed- 
eral courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those 
asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation's history 
or in this Court's decided cases, including our holding today, 
that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual 
or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the 
military ~vould go unnoticed or unremedied. 
The court improperly denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to 
prove their case because the majority refused to acknowledge that 
the plainti&, in their original complaint, had alleged actual First 
Amendment injury to themselves and, further, had alleged that the 
Army had conducted covert operations; they had been unable to 
substantiate these charges without witnesses. That no evidence 
existed in the trial court record to indicate covert infiltration of 
private events is attributable solely to the refusal of Judge Hart 
to permit witnesses to be heard in the District Court. 
Plainti& maintained, in their brief before the Supreme Court, 
as did the amici in their brief, that evidence could and would be 
introduced at a trial court hearing to show both the nature of the 
chilling effect upon the plaintiffs and the extent of MI clandestine 
operations. The majority, while making no reference to these allega- 
tions, took note of material filed by the Solicitor General which in- 
cluded Army and Defense Department directives relating to MI 
activities and c ~ m r n e n t e d , ~ ~  
Flhese directives indicate that the Army's review of the needs 
of its domestic intelligence activities has indeed been a con- 
tinuing one and that those activities have since been signifi- 
cantly reduced. 
119. 408 U.S. at 15. 
120. Id. 
121. Id at 8. 
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In fact, the degree of MI reduction in surveillance and data-compila- 
tion was highly contested by the plaintiffs in their brief and by the 
kno~vledgeable amici. The Court's reliance on the government direc- 
tives did not, in any event, adjudicate the legality of the challenged 
program. Even if the practices of MI had been curtailed or 
m h e  voluntary abandonment of a practice does not relieve 
a court of adjudicating its legality, particularly where the 
practice is deeply rooted and long standing. For if the case 
were dismissed as moot appellants would be "free to return 
to . . . [their] old ways." 
The Army practices, while largely expanded in the 1967-70 
period, began in 1917. The author personally had access to a vast 
number of reports on civilians from the 1940s and 1950s. The activity 
was deeply rooted; only the subjects which interested MI seemed 
to change, i.e., left wing organizations in the 1950s, new left, black 
and youth groups in the 1960s. 
The Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. T o  do this, 
the majority seized on a statement by plaintiffs' counsel during oral 
argument before Judge Hart.123 Counsel had stated that the plaintiffs 
were not cowed or chilled, but rather represented those Americans 
who would not and could not put themselves under public scrutiny 
and feared MI surveillance. Obviously, the Laird plainti& were not 
so immobilized as to be unable to initiate a suit. In view of their 
pre-hearing assertion that they had been affected and inhibited by the 
Army's program, it is difficult to understand the Court majority's 
interpretation of and reliance on one statement. The Court used 
one oral statement to negate all of plaintiffs' claims of First Amend- 
ment injury, ignoring all of plaintiffs' other assertions. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Laird plaintiffs, or other activ- 
ists bringing a future suit based on a chilling effect claim related 
to government activities, are actually not themselves chilled, the 
Court's decision may significantly narrow the protection of First 
Amendment freedoms as a practical reality. 
If activists cannot raise the question of the chilling effect unless 
they are personally cowed-and leaders are sometimes less vulnerable 
than average citizens-and such actions can be brought only by the 
personally chilled, can we expect many challenges to First Amend- 
ment inhibiting practices? As the brief amici pointed out to the 
- -- - 
122. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368. 376 (1963). 
123. See Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, at 959 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where a portion of 
the transaipt from the District Court hearing is reproduced. 
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Court, by requiring that litigants be either intimidated or demon- 
strate having been harmed in addition to intimidation, "the Gov- 
ernment would place all dissenters in the classic 'Catch 22' dilemma: 
they can invoke their rights if they are immobilized by fear, but if 
they really were immobilized by fear, they would not invoke their 
rights."l24 
The reality, of course, is that political activism cannot exist with- 
out followers as well as leaders, and i f  average Americans are deterred 
from exercising their First Amendment rights, those rights cease to 
be a public interest "of transcendent value to all society."lZ6 As Mr. 
Justice Erennan noted in Lamont, "It would be a barren market- 
place of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."lZB The Supreme 
Court's ruling in Laird may lay the foundation stone for that market- 
place. 
C. The Role of Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Before appointment to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Rehn- 
quist was an Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Jus- 
tice's O5ce of Legal C o u n ~ e l ? ~ ~  In  that capacity, he appeared on 
March 9, 1971 and March 17, 1971 at the Ervin Hearings to explain 
the Justice Department's role in MI surveillance of lawful political 
activity?Z* During the hearings, he testified at length about the legal- 
ity of military intelligence operations and directly presented his 
viewpoint on Laird u. Tatum. At one point, in response to a question 
from Senator Ervin, he stated:*9 
My only point of disagreement with you is to say whether 
as in the case of Tatum u. Laird that has been pending in the 
Court of Appeals here in the District of Columbia that an 
action will lie by private citizens to enjoin the gathering of 
124. Brief for Tatum, et al., as Amici Curiae, supra note 3'7, at 11. The "Catch 22" 
reference is to Joseph Heller's novel of the same name. In Heller's novel, an Anny 
Air Force bombardier during World War II requested relief from combat duty be- 
cause he thought everyone .was planning to kill him. The only way out of flying for the 
bombardier was Catch 22 
which specified that a concern for one's safety in the face of dangers that were 
real and immediate was the process of a rational mind . . . All he had to do rvas 
ask; (to be relieved from flying) and as soon as he did, he rvould no longer be crazy 
and would have to fly more missions. 
125. Dombro~vski v. Phter, 380 US. 479, 486 (1965). 
126. 381 US. at 308. 
127. Respondents' Motion to Recuse Mr. Justice Rehnquist Nunc Pro Tunc at 4, 
Laird v. Tatum, 408 US. 1 (1972). 
128. See I Hearings at  597-654 and at  849-914. 
129. Id. at 864. 
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information by the executive branch where there has been 
no threat of compulsory process and no pending action against 
any of those individuals on the part of the government. 
Rehnquist's statement then is similar to the conclusion later reached 
by the Court majority in Laird and is based on the same theory of 
standing and chilling effect doctrine.130 
The plainti&, in their motion to recuse Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 
cited Canons 2 and 3 of the Final Draft of the Code of Judicial Con- 
du~t.13~ They relied also on lower federal court decisions recusing 
other judges "under circumstances similar to those of Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist in the case at bar."132 
Had Justice Rehnquist abstained from voting, the Court of 
Appeals decision would have been affirmed by the vote of an equally 
divided court. By casting the decisive vote, Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
prevented the activists from obtaining the evidentiary hearing they 
sought and upheld his seemingly preconceived position regarding 
the merits of the case. 
Justice Rehnquist, on October 10, 1972, in an unprecedented 
action, issued a 16 page memorandum in which he denied the motion 
for recusal and explained his ~0s i t i on . l~~  Ackno~vledging that he had 
appeared as an expert witness during the Hearings,la4 he denied 
having any involvement in the Laird litigation while serving in the 
Department of J ~ s t i c e ? ~ ~  The Associate Justice maintained that he 
130. 408 U.S. at 1-16. 
131. Canon 2. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impro- 
priety in all his activities. 
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct 
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence 
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Canon 3. A judge should perform the duties of his office impartially and 
diligently. 
C. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or per- 
sonal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the pro- 
ceeding; 
@) he served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a law- 
yer with whom he previously practiced law served during such 
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such 
lawyer has been a material ~vitness concerning it. 
132. Respondents' Motion for Recusal, supra note 127, at 10. 
133. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Rehnquist (October 10, 1972), Laird v. Tatum, 
93 S. Ct. 7 (1972). 
134. Id. at  8-9. 
135. Id. at 10. 
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had been informed of the case as background preparation for his tes- 
timony as a Department of Justice representative at the HearingsJ3& 
In  his memorandum, Mr. Justice Rehnquist admitted super- 
vising the preparation of a memorandum of law on Laird v. Tatum 
in response to a request from Senator Hruska, a member of the Sub- 
committee on Constitutional Rights.fa7 Although no copy of the 
memorandum for Hruska is apparently available, Justice Rehnquist 
admitted that he "~vould expect such a memorandum to have 
commented on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Laird v. 
Tatum . . . . "138 
He stated, however, that he would never participate, as an Asso- 
ciate Justice, in a case in which he had signed a pleading or brief or 
actively participated prior to being appointed to the Supreme 
Thus he found no grounds for mandatory recusal. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist proceeded to examine the question of dis- 
cretionary recusal.140 Discretionary recusal is indicated where a 
judge had a previous relationship with a party to a litigation to such 
a degree that impropriety would be suggested by the judge's failure 
to recuse himself.141 He found, hotvever, that he had 
no hesitation in concluding that my total lack of connection 
while in the Department of Justice with the defense of the 
case of Laird v. Tatum does not suggest discretionary disqual- 
ification here because of my previous relationship with the 
Justice D e ~ a r t m e n t . ~ ~ ~  [emphasis added] 
The Associate Justice also stated that "none of the former Justices 
of this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of disqualifying 
themselves in cases involving points of law with respect to which 
they had expressed an opinion or formulated policy prior to ascend- 
ing to the bench."143 
Justice Rehnquist ackno~vledged that "fair minded judges might 
disagree about the matter,"144 which he admitted was a "fairly de- 
batable one."14s The Justice urged as a countervailing argument 
136. Id. at 9-10. 
137. Id. at 10. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 11. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 14. 
145. Id. 
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that, when not disqualified, judges have a duty to sit which is equally 
strong to the duty to recuse when indicated.14a 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's final argument for participating is in- 
triguing.147 
The prospect of affirmance by an equally divided Court, un- 
satisfactory enough in a single case, presents even more seri- 
ous problems where companion cases reaching opposite results 
are heard together here. [emphasis added] 
The Associate Justice noted that "the disqualification of one Justice 
of this Court raises the possibility of an affirmance of the judgment 
below by an equally divided court."14* He then found that "the con- 
sequence attending such a result is, of course, that the principle of 
law presented by the case is ~nsettled."l4~ 
The Associate Justice failed to realize that affirmance by an 
equally divided Court in Laird v. Tatum would merely insure that 
the plaintiffs obtained an opportunity to present evidence and make 
a record upon which the Supreme Court could, at a later date, con- 
cretely base a substantive review. Further, there were no companion 
cases to Laird u. Tatum before the Court. Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
must have been aware of the enormous quantity of material un- 
earthed during the Hearings, at which he himself testified, which 
strongly indicated that the Laird litigants could present evidence 
dealing with the issues raised by both the Supreme Court majority 
and the Court of Appeals dissent. Rather than settle a point of law, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's participation insured the continuance of a 
state of confusion. 
It is also difficult to accept the analogies constructed by Mr. Jus- 
tice Rehnquist to liken his participation to that by previous Justices. 
Justice Rehnquist was correct in stating in his memorandum that 
Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Frankfurter had both been 
involved in ~vriting books, encouraging the enactment of legislation, 
and commenting on matters of legal controversy before coming to 
the Supreme Neither, however, had participated in a case 
as politically charged as Laird v. Tatum, and on behalf of the Exec- 
utive Branch so soon before being appointed to the Court, as Justice 
Rehnquist did. 
146. Id. at 15. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 12. 
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Such problems as may follo~v an affirmance by an equally divided 
Court are of little import compared with the serious ethical dilemma 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's participation in Laird v. Tatum has posed 
for himself, the Court and the Constitution. 
An examination of the Ervin Hearings provides ample data upon 
which an analysis of the Army's activities can be made. The record 
reveals not an attempt by the Army to ignore or supplant civil and 
constitutional authority, but rather a program that can be charac- 
terized as at once coordinated and out of control, supervised and 
running free, benevolent and malign. 
In July 1967, racial violence broke out in Detroit, Michigan, 
with such intensity that federal military assistance was urgently re- 
quired to restore order with a minimum of bloodshed. Simulta- 
neous outbreaks occurred, with varying degrees of intensity, in a 
number of cities. The Army was not prepared; it had little or no 
relevant tactical intelligence. So little information was available that 
the author, on duty in the Pentagon's Army Operations Center, re- 
ceived a frantic call for information from an Army st& officer in 
Detroit who stated that Lieutenant General Throckmorton, the 
Army commander on the scene, tvas positioning his airborne troops 
with the aid of an oil company road map. 
Faced with the possibility of further outbreaks of violence at a 
time when troop strength in the United States was low because of 
the Vietnam war, the civilian and top military officers ordered MI 
to prepare for future civil disturbances and, if possible, predict fur- 
ther outbreaks. Very little guidance was given the General Staff MI 
analysts or the special agents in the field as to what preparation ~vas 
necessary or what information was relevant and desired.16* 
In the avo-and-one-half years between the Detroit riots and the 
first Pyle article, MI engaged increasingly in a widespread system of 
domestic surveillance and data-accumulation, largely ~vithout the 
knowledge and approval of civilian ~uperi0rs.l~~ 
The United States Army Intelligence Command, the component 
- -- 
151. The author, for example, was ordered by a superior officer to assume his duties 
with the simple command, "From now on, you're Mr. Nerv Left in the Pentagon. 
Start a desk." 
152. The failure of the appointed civiIian superiors in the Department of Defense 
and the Department of the Army to discover that the Army, and MI in particular, was 
running a nationwide surveillance operation has, of course, serious constitutional 
implications in itself with which this comment cannot deal. 
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responsible for most of the MI agents in the country,lGa issued in- 
creasingly ambitious and far-flung collection requirements.lG4 Before 
the end of 1967, an initial concern with racial violence had led to re- 
quirements that special agents monitor virtually every form of dis- 
sent in the United States. 
As direct agent coverage increased, other agencies, especially the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, responded to Army requests for in- 
formation by sending extensive classified reports reflecting informa- 
tion collected from covert and other sources on the politics of dissent. 
T o  maintain this data, several computerized data banks were 
established. The largest and the most complete was at the United 
States Army Investigative Records Repository at Fort Holabird, 
Maryland. 
A phenomenon known as bureaucratic accretion and the appli- 
cation of military institutional paradigms, a not surprising develop- 
ment, assured that the data banks ~vould grow immensely. The 
majority of participants in the MI program saw their activities as 
being in  the best interests of the American people, rather than as 
creating a threat to liberty. Of particular relevance is the warning 
by Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States:lGG 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men 
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasions of their 
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty 
lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-mean- 
ing but without understanding. 
Such men largely directed and carried out the Army's program. In 
a disquieting minority of instances, individuals of relatively low 
rank undertook operations which, when made public, astounded and 
embarrassed their superiors?Ge 
- 
153. A small number of agents assigned to combat units came under the command 
of the Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Most MI special agents 
were assigned to the US. Army Intelligence Command, Fort Holabird, Maryland. 
These agents, working out of field and resident offices throughout the country, were 
primarily involved in conducting routine background checks-knorvn as Personnel 
Security I n v e s t i g a t i o ~ n  individuals entering the Armed Forces and the Army in 
particular. This activity rvas not challenged by the plaintiffs in Laird v. Tatum. 
154. See 11 Hearings $assim for a sampling of these mission requirements. See ako 
testimony of former special agents and other Army personnel in I Hearings. 
155. 277 US. 438, 479 (1928). 
156. See the testimony of former Army StaE Sergeant John M. O'Brien in I Hearings 
at  100 et seq. O'Brien's revelation that he had been directed to monitor the activities 
of elected officials in the Chicago area, including US. Senator Adlai E. Stevenson 111, 
shocked the entire nation and led to a court challenge to MI practices in the Chicago 
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A large part of the MI effort involved monitoring youth and 
campus groups. Information £rom a number of agencies was regu- 
larly transmitted to the Army with reference to youth involvement 
in antiwar and campus activities. The Army is predominantly com- 
posed of young men and women. It is naive to deny the very con- 
siderable chilling effect which this Army activity exerts on a wide 
range of America's young men and women who might one day serve 
in the Army. Anonymity is a vital component of the right to protest 
for many.lG7 Stripped of this anonymity by an intelligence system 
which recorded, but never deleted, many Americans would undoubt- 
edly consider themselves to be identified with unorthodox view- 
points by government. Participation would diminish from the 
resultant chill of First Amendment rights. Had an evidentiary hear- 
ing been granted in Laird 3. Tatum, the plainti&' allegations of 
chilling effect might well have been substantiated using this vast 
group alone. 
The Army's activities exerted a chill on other groups too. One 
of the most informative experiences ever encountered by the author 
occurred in 1970, in Detroit, during the taping of an interview 
show. The host was a leading black militant, the audience repre- 
sented diverse segments of black Detroit and the topic was MI sur- 
veillance. When questions were solicited from the audience, the first 
question, to the author's temporary confusion, was "Does the Army 
have a King Alked plan?" The audience became visibly uneasy and 
distressed. The host explained that the "King Al£red plan" was the 
creation of black novelist John Williams in his work, The Man Who 
Cried I Am. The fictional plan was a government operation for the 
area. The action, ACLU v. Laird, 463 F2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972) was brought by a 
number of political activists allegedly under surveillance by MI  personnel in Illinois. 
The action was dismissed by the District Court after an evidentiary hearing in which 
much material was brought to public attention. The seriousness of the hearing was 
tempered somewhat when a career MI civilian intelligence officer, responding to 
O'Brien's charge that MI had harassed civilians by dispatching unordered pizza pie 
to the homes of political activists, firmly asserted that he and the members of his 
unit had ordered fried chicken instead for the activists. The dismissal was a5rmed 
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit with Laird v. Tatum Wing cited as 
controlling. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 41 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1973). 
157. See Address by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., March 2, 1970, in Appendix to A p  
pellants' Brief at 68-69, Tatum v. Laid, 444 F9d 947. See A. W ~ N ,  PRIVACY m 
F ~ ~ m o h t  (1967), the seminal work on the role of and need for privacy and individual 
autonomy in our society. See also A. -R, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971), an 
excellent study of the threat to privacy posed by technological advances. Police surveil- 
lance is an increasing problem as police departments expand their capacity for intelli- 
gence operations of a type formerly conducted only by federal agencies in internal 
security matters. A study of the First Amendment problems inherent in such activities 
is well covered in F. Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging Principles of First Amend- 
ment Adjudication, 22 STAN. L. REV. 196 (1970). 
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annihilation of black Americans in a manner reminiscent of Hitler's 
genocidal schemes. Despite assurances by the author that no such 
plan existed, the audience's fear, irrational yet profoundly disturb- 
ing, demonstrated the effect a government program of surveillance 
can have on a minority group. Without an evidentiary hearing, the 
Supreme Court, of course, had no inkling that such a response to 
MI activities may be felt by a wide range of Americans. 
It cannot be gainsaid, however, that the Army must have some 
pre-commitment information to avoid repetitions of the oil com- 
pany road map fiasco in Detroit. According to Senator Ervin,lG8 
The business of the Army. . . is to know about the condition 
of highways, bridges, and facilities. It is not to predict trends 
and reactions by keeping track of the thoughts and actions of 
Americans exercising First Amendment freedoms . . . . Re- 
gardless of the imagined military objective, the chief casualty 
of this overkill is the Constitution of the United States, which 
every military officer and every appointed official has taken an 
oath to defend. 
I n  Powell u. McCormack, the Court affirmed that in our country 
living under a written constitution, no branch or department 
of the government is supreme; and it is the province and duty 
of the judicial department to determine in cases regularly 
brought before them, whether the powers of any branch of 
the government . . . have been exercised in conformity of the 
Const i t~ t ion?~~ 
The Supreme Court failed to live up to that standard in Laird u. 
Tatum by refusing to allow American citizens the opportunity to 
prove that the Army was not exercising its powers in conformity 
with the Constitution. There may not be a second chance to try this 
issue. All the former Army personnel who revealed information 
about the MI program were citizen-soldiers serving one tour of duty 
in wartime. Career professionals did not step fonvard as is under- 
standable. With the end of the Vietnam war and the transition to a 
volunteer Army, it is likely that a future MI surveillance program 
could operate to the possible detriment of millions of Americans 
with little information, especially of a probative nature, reaching 
the American public. 
Already, other actions are being dismissed based on the Supreme 
158. Appellants' Brief, supra note 59, at 68-69. 
159. 395 U.S. 486, at 506 (1969). 
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Court's decision in Laird v. Tatum.ls0 Mr. Justice Douglas, whose 
opinions ring true with a love for First ~mindmen t  freedoms, said 
in his dissent in Laird v. Tatum:lol 
This case is a cancer in our body politic. It is a measure of the 
disease which afflicts us. Army surveillance, like Army regi- 
mentation, is at war with the principles of the First Amend- 
ment. Those who already walk submissively will say there is 
no cause for alarm. But submissiveness is not our heritage. . . . 
The Bill of Rights ~vas designed to keep agents of government 
and official eavesdroppers away from assemblies of people. . . . 
There can be no influence more paralyzing of that objective 
than Army surveillance. When an intelligence officer looks 
over every nonconformist's shoulder in the library or walks 
invisibly by his side in a picket line or infiltrates his club, the 
America once extolled as the voice of liberty around the world 
no longer is cast in  the image which Jefferson and Madison 
designed. . . . 
160. See e.g., Donohoe V. Duling, 465 F2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972), a challenge to police 
coverage of protest meetings, which was dismissed on August 1, 1972. In Donohoe, 42 
individual plaintiffs sought to represent those made timorous by the presence of police 
observers who photographed individual participants. The court majority, citing Laird 
v. Tatum, found that the plainti& had failed to show a chilling effect injury to them- 
selves as a result of defendant's activities, and therefore thev would not be ~ermitted 
to represent those who were allegedly so affected. 
A 
161. 408 US. at 28. 
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